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RESTA TEMENT SECOND. OMITTED TERMS
AND CONTRACT METHOD
Richard E. Speidelt
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is an impressive commen-
tary on private law by an influential private group, the American Law
Institute. It presents a comprehensive and integrated body of general,
rather than specialized, contract law. More importantly, it provides a
blueprint for judicial reasoning in the adjudication of contract disputes.'
For this reason alone, the document deserves careful study.
One promising study technique is to select a "core" idea that, upon
careful analysis, will reveal an underlying contract method. For the
"core" idea I have selected section 204, entitled "Supplying an Omitted
Essential Term." According to the Reporter, section 204 is "new" to the
Restatement Second.2 I focus upon method because changes in the modes
of operating, or in the means of obtaining results, from the first Restate-
ment to the Restatement Second are thought to be important. Professor
Havighurst, writing in 1933, concluded that the first Restatement, then
new, had roots in the past and was the "result of a time honored
method."'3 Professor Braucher, the first Reporter of the Restatement Sec-
ond, wrote that stylistic revisions in early drafts of the Restatement Second
were symptomatic of a fundamental shift in modes of thought from the
t Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. A.B. 1954, Denison Uni-
versity; LL.B. 1957, University of Cincinnati; LL.M. 1958, Northwestern University. My
thanks to Ms. Marlene R. DuBow, Northwestern University School of Law, Class of 1982, for
her assistance in the preparation of this Article.
I According to its Reporter, the Restatement Second was formulated with a "proper view
of the judicial function in mind" to provide a "modest but essential aid in the improved
analysis, clarification, unification, growth and adaptation of the common law." Farnsworth,
Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5
(1981) (quoting Professor Herbert Wechsler).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204, Reporter's Note (1979). The prob-
lem of judicial "gap filling," however, is hardly new, see Prosser, Open Price in Contracts for the
Sale of Goods, 16 MINN. L. REv. 733 (1932), and the Restatement Second's solution is, as we shall
see, hardly innovative. See U.C.C. §§ 2-301 to 2-328. See also Braucher, Interpretation andLegal
E Ject in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 13, 14-15 (1981) (§ 204 is based
on the work of the Reporter, Professor Farnsworth); Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in
Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 860 (1968). For a recent and unprecedented exercise in judicial
"gap filling," see Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa.
1980), discussed in Speidel, Courl-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Tenn Supply Contracts, 76
Nw. U.L. REv. 369 (1981).
3 Havighurst, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REv. 910, 922 (1933).
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"doctrinal" to "explanation and rationalization."'4 Similarly, Professor
Corbin, an adviser to both Restatements, concluded just before his
death in 1967 that the Restatement Second, although founded upon and
not wholly inconsistent in substance with the first Restatement, would
show "many differences, sometimes in substance, and throughout in
forms of expression." 5 Because "modes of thought" and "forms of ex-
pression" are important ingredients in method, examining them in con-
junction with a "new" substantive idea should be instructive. Much has
happened in the legal community since the Restatement Second project was
started in the early 1960s, A study of this sort might reveal something
about the nature, current utility, and future prospects of the Restatement
Second and its place in the constantly evolving law of contracts.
I
FROM RULES TO STANDARDS
One shift in method from the Restatement to the Restatement Second is
revealed by the dominance of standards over rules6 in the processes of
contract formation and interpretation. Of course, there are still some
enduring "rules," such as the requirement that a bargain contract must
have both a promise and a consideration. To put the matter more elab-
orately, both Restatements require a "manifestation of mutual assent to
a bargain" plus consideration to form a contract.7 The shift from rules
to standards appears within this statement of general requirements. To
appreciate this, some background is needed.
4 The crisply authoritative style of the original not unnaturally tended to reflect
the doctrinal temper of the latter part of the nineteenth century. Explanation
and rationalization, in contrast, are likely to force attention to social change,
to produce qualification and restraint in the interest of realism, and to end in
reliance on utilitarian ideals.
Braucher, OFer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE LJ. 302, 303 (1964).
5 Corbin, Samuel Williston, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1329 (1963). According to Professor
Braucher, Williston, who was the Reporter for the first Restatement, "provided a bridge be-
tween the contrasting dogmatisms of O.W. Holmes and C.C. Langdell, on the one hand, and
the focus of mid-twentieth century thought on purpose and function, on the other."
Braucher, supra note 4, at 303. The "modernism" of Corbin provided a bridge between Wil-
liston and the realists. Corbin was acceptable to the realists, while Williston was not. Id. On
the influence of other persons on the drafting of the Restatement Second, see Farnsworth, supra
note 1, at 3-5. For more on the roles of Langdell, Holmes, and Williston in the development
of the grand theory of contract, see G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
6 In jurisprudence, the tension is between positivism, which is "a model of aid for a
system of rules," and what Professor Dworkin has called "principles, policies and other sorts
of standards." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977). The difference has sub-
stantive implications. See Kennedy, Fonn and Substance in Pivate Law Adjidication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1685 (1976), where it is argued that a model of clearly defined, highly adminis-
trable, general rules is used to foster the substantive idea of "individualism" while the idea of
"altruism" can be realized by use of equitable standards producing ad hoc decisions with
relatively little precedential value.
7 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1979) with RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS §§ 1, 3, 4, 19, 10 & 75 (1932).
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Suppose that A and B manifest assent to the exchange of a de-
scribed service for a price "to be agreed upon in the future." A com-
mences performance, but shortly thereafter, B repudiates the bargain.
A claims that B has breached a contract and must pay damages mea-
sured by A's expectation interest. B argues that no contract was formed.
Who should prevail? Professor Williston, in the first edition of his trea-
tise, stated that there could be "no legal obligation" in cases of this sort
until the parties had agreed in fact on the price. Because either party
could refuse to agree, it was "impossible for the law to affix any obliga-
tion to such a promise."'8 The Restatement, of which Williston was Re-
porter, prescribed that an offer "must be so definite in its terms, or
require such definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and per-
formances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain." 9 It
explained that because "the law of contracts deals only with duties de-
fined by the expressions of the parties, the rule. . . is one of necessity as
well as of law." 10 In dealing with the problem of an "agreement to
agree," the Restatement made it clear that when the "only method of set-
tling the price is dependent on future agreement of the parties, and...
either party may refuse to agree, there is no contract."" The answer,
then, was clear: A had no contract claim against B and, unless the part-
perormance could be severed or had benefited B, A had no claim for
restitution. 12 This followed even though A might have been able to es-
tablish a reasonable market price for the agreed services.
There were, of course, reasons to support this result: a policy judg-
ment that contract law should be certain, especially in the formation
process; an empirical assumption that bargains were discrete transac-
8 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 45 (1920).
9 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 32 (1932).
10 Id., Comment a.
11 Id., Illustration 10. The Comments, however, state that where the parties "intended
to enter into a bargain," the "law endeavors to give a sufficiently clear meaning to offers and
promises" and that definiteness might be acquired by the "subsequent words or acts" of the
parties. Id., Comments b-c. Thus, if the price were left open rather than "to be agreed,"
Professor Williston concluded, the "law invokes here . . . the standard of reasonableness"
(market price). 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 41 (1920).
12 The Restatement did not cover restitution as a remedy if an intended contract failed for
indefiniteness. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 347, Introductory Note (1932). The Re-
statement Second deals with restitution claims if a contract has been voided for fraud, duress,
mistake, or impracticability. See Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 37 (1981). It states that action in reliance on an agreement that fails for
indefiniteness "makes appropriate a contractual remedy" in that the agreement may be
treated as divisible with payment at the contract rate, or an implied promise may be found in
order to reimburse A for the reasonable value of his part-performance. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 34(3) (1979); id., Comment d; see Coleman Eng'r Co. v. North Am.
Aviation, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 396, 417-20, 420 P.2d 713, 727-29, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1, 15-17 (1966)
(Traynor, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of restitution in contracts unenforceable for in-
definiteness, see E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN THE CONTRACT LAW 291-309 (2d ed.
1977); II G. PALMER, LAw OF RESTITUTION § 6.1 (1978).
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tions in which the parties would reach agreement on all material terms
at the time of contracting; and an aversion to the practical difficulties
involved in supplying a term when the parties had failed to agree.
These reasons translated into rules of law that required the initial agree-
ment to be clear and complete and were typified by the bromide that
courts do not "make contracts" for the parties. 13 Frequently, however,
these reasons were hidden as the courts searched "out there" for the
rules to be applied with ineluctable logic to the issues posed in the par-
ticular dispute at hand. These rules were, of course, the product of prior
judicial decisions that had been abstracted, synthesized, and classified
by scholars for future use. One can overstate the dominance of this
"time-honored method" in contract law. Yet Pound called it mechani-
cal jurisprudence' 4 and, for some, it typified the classical model of con-
tract-a model that featured the reasonable man as the arbiter of
disputes, rules that demanded complete agreement before a bargain
contract was formed, and impossibility before performance was dis-
charged, while enforcing bargains primarily through damage awards
rather than specific performance.15
Both the classical model of contract and the time-honored method
have been under continuous attack. The realists 16 mounted the attacks
most relevant to the tension between rules and standards in the early
part of this century. From the realist perspective, any view that there
was a universe of rules discoverable by deduction and applicable to a
limited set of operative facts was suspect. The realists rejected the argu-
13 See, e.g., Transamerica Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Union Bank, 426 F.2d 273 (9th Cir.
1970); Walker v. Keith, 382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964); Willhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud,
197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (1936); Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N.Y. 223, 111 N.E. 822 (1916).
See also Goebel v. National Exchangors, Inc., 88 Wis. 2d 596, 277 N.W.2d 755 (1979) (agree-
ment fatally vague as to a material term). On the nature of discrete transactions and the
demands of classical contract law, see Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854, 856-
65 (1978) (law requires for certainty a complete projection of the transaction into the future
through promises). For the dilemmas posed by contract doctrine that requires complete
agreement for contract formation and stipulates the effect of failure as either contract or no-
contract, see Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 673 (1969).
14 Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908). See also White, From
SociologicalJurisprudence To Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Centuy
America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999, 1000-12 (1972). But see R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 15-16
(suggesting that real mechanical jurisprudents are difficult if not impossible to find).
15 The essence of this grand theory of contract is caught in G. GILMORE, supra note 5, at
5-53. See Strasser, Contract's "Many Futures" After Death. Unanswered Questions of Scope and Air-
pose, 32 S.C.L. REv. 501, 530-37 (1981) (primary goal of conventional contract law is to
resolve private disputes, not to regulate society). For another view, see M. HORWTz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 161-210 (1977) (primary goal of con-
tract law is to protect private markets).
16 According to Pound, realism was not a school but, rather, a "point of view." Pound,
Fifty Years ofJurisprudence, 51 HARV. L. REv. 777, 790-98 (1938). The perspective was that
law in society was part of life and must be viewed in relation to a changing social context. See
Yntema, American Legal Rea/ism in Retrospect, 14 VAND. L. REv. 317, 323 (1960).
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ment that there was a theory of contract that required results even
though harsh and, at times, inconsistent with the precedents or relation-
ships surrounding the bargain. Much of this attack was launched
against Williston's early editions. Corbin, for example, claimed that
Williston had failed to distinguish between "operative facts" and result-
ing legal relations and that he placed an excessive reliance on theory not
supported by the precedents or responsive to the actual facts in dis-
pute.17 Twenty years later, W. W. Cook, reviewing Williston's second
edition, made similar criticisms and questioned whether important
questions arising in actual cases could be answered by "a priori theo-
rizing or by tacit assumptions ... ."18 Cook argued that the "relevant
phenomena" for observation were the reported judicial decisions and
that a better method would be to classify the cases by factual patterns
rather than by doctrine. He claimed several advantages for this
method:
(1) it would first of all recognize the complex character of the human
relationships dealt with in the law of contracts; (2) it would thereby
help to bring into the forefront of the discussion the social and eco-
nomic problems involved; (3) it would not relegate to the category of
"exceptional" or "anomalous" rules of law which deal sensibly with
those problems; and (4) it would enable courts to deal more intelli-
gently with new situations as these arise in a developing social and
economic order. 19
Cook proposed a general method capable of better comprehending
reality in contract litigation. Corbin, a contracts scholar, spent most of
his life elaborating and perfecting this method. Corbin viewed contract
law as an evolutionary process consisting of tentative generalizations de-
rived from a vast number of individual instances to be continually tested
and reexamined in the light of the sources from which they are drawn:
the customs, business practices, feelings, and opinions of man-the pre-
vailing mores of the time and place.20 In this process, the certainty of
law was an illusion and the creativity of judges a necessity. Conse-
quently, standards rather than rules were essential, for standards both
permitted and required the particular dispute to be set in context. The
answers were not "out there" in some system of rules, but "in" the social
and economic context surrounding the particular transaction.
2'
17 Corbin, Book Review, 30 YALE LJ. 773 (1921); Corbin, Book Review, 29 YALE LJ.
942 (1920).
18 Cook, Williston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 497, 502 (1939).
19 d. at 511.
20 For a succinct summary of Corbin's method, see Kessler, Arthur Linton Corbin, 78 YALE
LJ. 517, 521 (1969).
21 Corbin's view of law was expressed early in his career:
[L]aw does not consist of a series of unchangeable rules or principles. . ..
Every system of justice and of right is of human development, and the neces-
sary corollary is that no known system is eternal. In the long history of the
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Corbin's approch is illustrated in part by his solution to the "agree-
ment to agree" problem. He rejected the classical rule that there could
be no contract until there was agreement. The initial question was
whether the parties intended to conclude a bargain even if an essential
term were left to future agreement.2 2 If so, the court should be "slow to
conclude" that no contract was formed and should make every effort to
fill the gap by recourse to reasonable market terms: "Many a gap in
terms can be filled, and should be, with a result that is consistent with
what the parties said and that is more just to both than would be a
refusal of enforcement. '23 The search for intention and reasonable mar-
ket terms might be unsuccessful, in which case the contract would fail
for indefiniteness. But contract law, packaged as standards rather than
rules, directed the court to consider a wide range of circumstances in the
transactional context. Cook's general method of perceiving reality,
therefore, was sharpened and focused by Corbin's commitment to con-
textualize the particular dispute.
Another example of this commitment and the triumph of standards
over rules is found in Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code,
whose principal architect, Karl N. Llewellyn, has been described as a
"leader of the American realists."' 24 How would our "agreement to
agree" hypothetical come out under the UCC?
Section 2-204 sets the stage by dispensing with the rigid rules of
offer and acceptance contained in the first Restatement.25 A contract for
the sale of goods can be made "in any manner sufficient to show agree-
ment, including conduct by both parties that recognizes the existence of
such a contract," and "[a]n agreement sufficient to constitute a contract
for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is undeter-
mined."'26 Section 2-204(3) then provides:
law can be observed the birth and death of legal principles .... The law is
merely a part of our changing civilization. The history of law is the history of
man and of society. Legal principles represent the prevailing mores of the
time, and with the mores they must necessarily be born, survive for the ap-
pointed season, and perish.
Corbin, Preface to W. ANSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS v (A. Corbin ed. 1919).
22 "A transaction is complete when the parties mean it to be complete." I A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 29 (1963).
23 Id. § 97. See also id. § 95.
24 Clark, Karl N. Llewelyn, 29 U. CHL'L. REV. 614, 614 (1962). See generally W. TWIN-
ING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); Verdun-Jones, The Jurispru-
dence of(arl Llewlyn, 1 DALHOUSIE L.J. 441 (1974). According to Grant Gilmore, Llewellyn
was an "enthusiastic demolisher" of the classical jurisprudence but was not a system
builder-he preferred the particular over the general and method over theory. Gilmore, In
Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 813-14 (1962).
25 See generaly Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Juris-
prudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REv. 213 (1966) (obligation based on agree-
ment-in-fact rather than rules).
26 u.C.C. § 2-204(1) & (2).
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Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does
not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a con-
tract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.
2 7
Section 2-305, which deals with "agreements to agree" on price, builds
upon section 2-204(3). If the parties "so intend," they can conclude a
contract for sale even though the price is "open"; that is, they have left it
to "be agreed."'28 They may intend "not to be bound unless the price be
. . .agreed"; if so, "there is no contract" until agreement is reached.
29
But if they intend to conclude a contract and the price is not agreed
upon, then the price is "a reasonable price at the time for delivery,"
30
subject to the overall limitation that the agreement with the supplied
price term must afford a "reasonably certain basis for giving an appro-
priate remedy."'3 1 This "Corbinesque" approach to the problem of open
price is carried over to other omitted terms by Article Two, Part Three
of the UCC. If the parties "intend" to create a contract, if there is no
agreement to the contrary, and if there is a reasonably certain basis for
enforcement, the Code provides judicial "gap filling" standards for all
terms thought essential to the bargain.
32
A more complete triumph of standards over rules is hard to imag-
ine. Furthermore, such standards as "intention to conclude a contract,"
"reasonable price," and "reasonably certain basis" for enforcement re-
quire particularization within the commercial circumstances made rele-
vant by the definition of agreement. According to Richard Danzig, this
method reflects Llewellyn's view that the law of the transaction is im-
bedded in the total situation and that the task of the "law authority" is
to discover it. Law is "immanent" in existing patterns of conduct or
relationships and, when discovered, provides a more reliable source of
certainty than does the rigid, external system of classical contract law.
33
The problem with standards is that they may lead the court to water
without explaining how to drink. As Danzig describes it, the drafters of
27 Id. § 2-204(3).
28 Id. § 2-305(1).
29 Id. § 2-305(4).
30 Id. § 2-305(l)(b).
31 Id. § 2-204(3).
32 See, e.g., Caisson Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 622 F.2d 672, 677-79 (3d Cir. 1980);
Riegel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975); U.C.C. §§ 2-304 to 2-
315; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 96-147 (2d ed. 1980).
33 Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisrudence ofthe Unform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV.
621, 626 (1975);see Corbin, A Tribute to Karl Llewelyn, 71 YALE L.J. 805, 812 (1962), conclud-
ing that Llewellyn sought a "situation sense" from similar cases grouped as "human histories
about situations which have arisen . S ee also Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1704-05, sug-
gesting that the UCC adopted standards on the ground that concepts like "'reasonableness'
and 'good faith' provide greater predictability in practice than the intricate rule system they
have replaced."
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the Code left off at critical points, leaving the judge to fill in from what
the parties could extract from the commercial context. 34 Put another
way, the method pointed to the commercial context without clarifying
how the diverse data were to be assembled and used.
The difficulties posed by this apparent delegation of discretion to
the court are reflected in the continuing debate over "unconscionabil-
ity," 3 5 the current interest in the scope and content of the "good faith"
duty,36 and the concern over how one ascertains the "intention" of the
parties.3 7 In short, it seems clear that the triumph of standards in Arti-
cle Two is not without problems, for the very method of perceiving and
ordering reality is incomplete. The conscious decision to contextualize,
itself of jurisprudential significance,38 may be undercut by the lack of
guidance to, and control over, both the parties and the court.
II
OMITTED TERMS: THE Restatement Second APPROACH
In the remainder of this Article, we will consider the Restatement Sec-
ond's approach to solving the problem of omitted terms. It is not surpris-
ing that Article Two of the UCC has had a substantial influence on the
Restatement process and that standards rather than rules dominate the
discussion and analysis. We will next consider whether the Restatement
34 Danzig, supra note 33, at 627-3 1. According to Danzig, Article Two operates more as
a means of dictating a method than as a means of dictating a result. "That method was
designed to prompt decision not according to the letter or the logic of a statute or juristic
concept but rather according to the 'situation-reason.'" Id. at 632. Yet Article Two masks
the reasons needed to support results and, by delegating the task of finding the law "imma-
nent" in the situation to the judge, reinforces the morals of the market place. For additional
discussion of code methodology, see Hillman, 4 Study of Uniform Commercial Code Methodology:
Contract Modifcation Under Article Two, 59 N.C.L. REV. 335 (1981); McDonnell, Purposive Inter-
pretation of the Unifonn Commercial Code.: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
795 (1978); Note, How Appellate Opinions ShouldJust(i/ Decisions Made Under the U.C., 29
STAN. L. REV. 1245 (1977).
35 See, e.g., Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975);
Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionabilitp: A New Framework for U. CC Section 2-
302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1981); Leff, Unconscionabilil and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Murray, Unconscionabilio: Unconscionabilitp, 31 U. PITT.
L. REV. 1 (1969).
36 See generaly Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniorn
Commercial Code, 67 IowA L. REV. 1 (198 1); Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith,
1981 DUKE LJ. 619.
37 See generally Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Un/brm Commercial Code, 51
OR. L. REV. 269, 272-76 (1972).
38 See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1701-10 (suggesting that while contextualization may
enhance understanding of the function and workability of law in particular situations, it is
likely to ignore "other ideas about the proper ordering of society, and particularly. . . ideas
about the proper substantive content of legal rules." Id. at 1702; cf. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-22, 88-112 (1977) (perspective of "ordinary ob-
server"). In short, contextualization, no matter how clearly defined as a method, tends to
reinforce the "is"-the dominant pattern of social expectations.
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Second improves upon Code method in ascertaining, where relevant, the
intention of the parties and, where agreement fails, in supplying a term
under section 204. My conclusion is that the method for ascertaining
intention has been improved by use of the "reason to know" test, but
that no method has been developed to assist or control the parties and
the court in supplying terms when section 204 is applicable. The analy-
sis defining when section 204 can be used, however, is helpful. Finally, I
offer some tentative conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of
the Restatement Second as American contract law heads for the twenty-first
century.
A. Bargains, Assent, and the "Reason to Know" Test
Section 204, which is at the heart of the matter, is entitled "Supply-
ing an Omitted Essential Term." It is placed in Chapter 9, dealing with
the "Scope of Contractual Obligations," and in Topic 1, entitled "The
Meaning of Agreements." Section 204 provides:
When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract
have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determi-
nation of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the
circumstances is supplied by the court.39
Section 204 does not apply unless there is a bargain, defined as an
"agreement to exchange" promises, performances, or a mix thereof.40
Agreement is defined as a "manifestation of mutual assent on the part of
two or more persons."'4 ' The theoretical structure of the bargain con-
tract is built upon these definitions. Working with the essential opera-
tive facts of "promise" and "consideration, '42 the formation of a
contract requires a "bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual
assent to the exchange and a consideration. '43 To this extent, the Re-
statement Second is consistent with the first Restatement,44 although the per-
vasiveness of the consideration requirement has clearly been reduced.45
In the bargain contract, words or conduct may manifest assent to
an exchange.46 Here, the Restatement Second makes a distinction and
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979).
40 Id. § 3 (1979).
41 Id.; cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) ("'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact
.. . .1).
42 Under the Restatement Second, a legally enforceable contract cannot exist without a
promise, but there can be such a contract without consideration. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1, 17(2), 82-94 (1979). To constitute consideration, the agreed ex-
change must be "bargained for." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1979);
see Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM.
L. REv. 52 (1981).
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1979).
44 See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 1, 3, 4, 19, 20, 75 (1932).
45 This retreat is tracked and applauded in G. GILMORE, supira note 5, at 76-77.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1979).
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states a test that is vital to understanding section 204. It differentiates
between "term of the promise" and "term of the contract." The former,
like a promise and consideration, is an operative fact: it is "that portion
of the intention or assent manifested which relates to a particular mat-
ter. " 47 An agreed price term is a "term of the promise." The latter is
that part of the resulting legal relationship that relates to a particular
matter "whether or not the parties manifest an intention to create those
relations.148 "Term of the contract," then, would include the duty to
perform in good faith 49 as well as a term supplied under section 204.
Neither are agreed upon; both are imposed as part of the bargain
contract.
The test is designed to determine the scope, effectiveness, and
meaning of agreement. Suppose that A asserts that conduct by B consti-
tuted a promise, defined as a "manifestation of intention to act or re-
frain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made." 50 Because the
promise may be "inferred wholly or partly from conduct," 51 how is the
court to determine whether A's inference of a commitment was justified?
The answer is found in section 19(2): B's conduct is "not effective" as a
manifestation of assent (here a promise) unless B "knows or has reason
to know" that A "may infer from B's conduct that B assents." If the
"reason to know" test is satisfied, A is presumably justified in believing
that a commitment has been made.
When does a person have "reason to know" that another has con-
cluded from his words or conduct that a promise has been made? The
"reason to know" test 52 can be broken into five related questions:
47 Id. § 5.
48 Id.
49 Id. § 205 ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement."); cf. U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 1-201(19), 2-103(l)(b)
(requiring good faith). For recent literature on good faith, see note 36 supra.
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1979).
51 Id. § 4. The Comments and Reporter's Note concede that both "inference" and "im-
plied in fact" refer to the ascertainment of agreement in fact. To avoid confusion with the
term "implied in law," however, the use of "inference" is preferred. Id. § 4, Comment b,
Reporter's Note.
52 A person has reason to know a fact, present or future, if he has information
from which a person of ordinary intelligence would infer that the fact in ques-
tion does or will exist. A person of superior intelligence has reason to know a
fact if he has information from which a person of his intelligence would draw
the inference. There is also reason to know if the inference would be that
there is such a substantial chance of the existence of the fact that, if exercising
reasonable care with reference to the matter in question, the person would
predicate his action upon the assumption of its possible existence. . . . [Tihe
words "reason to know" are used both where the actor has a duty to another
and where he would not be acting adequately in the protection of his own
interests were he not acting with reference to facts which he has reason to
know.
Id. § 19, Comment b. "'Reason to know' depends not only on the words or other conduct,
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(1) Did A understand in fact that B had made a promise? If not,
there is no manifestation of assent.
(2) If so, did B know (that is, have actual knowledge) at the time of
his conduct of A's understanding? If so, a promise is made.
(3) If B did not know, of what facts in the "total situation" did B
have actual knowledge?
(4) Given this knowledge, and taking B's level of intelligence into
account, would B infer that if he acted or spoke in a certain way, A
would understand that a commitment was made? If so, B has "reason
to know" of that understanding.
(5) If not, would B infer that there was a substantial chance that A
would understand that a commitment was made? If so, B does have a
duty to act with reasonable care to avoid misunderstanding; a failure to
proceed with reasonable care is, apparently, tantamount to "reason to
know."
Thus, the "reason to know" test is the Restatement Second's connect-
ing link between the alleged promise in a particular bargain and the
surrounding context. Whether a promise was made is a question of fact
inferred from what the promisee understood and what the promisor
"had reason to know" would be understood. The test is a technique for
inference that is employed for different purposes throughout the Restate-
ment Second.5 3 As with all such techniques, there is room for policy to
but also on the circumstances, including previous communications of the parties and the
usages of their community or line of business." Id. § 26, Comment a. "A wide variety of
elements of the total situation may be relevant to the interpretation of such conduct." Id.
§ 19, Comment a.
53 Exactly what A knew or had reason to know B understood is a question for the trier of
fact. See Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979). The rele-
vance of this fact question will vary with the legal questions posed. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 15(l)(b) (mental capacity), 19(2) (conduct as assent), 20 (material
misunderstanding), 26 (preliminary negotiations), 69 (conduct as acceptance), 153 (mistake
by one party), 201 (ascertainment of meaning), 220-221 (effect of usage) (1979). Resolution
of disputes over the meaning of words and conduct in an otherwise enforceable bargain con-
tract will be a principal use of the test. See Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76
YALE L.J. 939, 942-52 (1967). Section 201 was strongly influenced by Professor Corbin and
drafted to "deemphasize meaning supplied by rules of construction existing in the law and to
direct attention to the context in which the parties make their agreement." Braucher, supra
note 2, at 14. According to Professor Corbin, in determining whether A had reason to know
the meaning attached by B to a term in the agreement, the trier of fact should be advised of:
[A]ll the surrounding circumstances; of the meaning that is given to the lan-
guage of the agreement by common usage, by usage in the trade or business
or profession of the parties; of communications between the parties during the
preliminary negotiations and during execution of the writing; and of subse-
quent interpretations and practical application by either party that is as-
sented to or acted upon by the other.
3 A. CORBIN, supra note 22, § 538, at 69. But see Palmer, The Efect of Misunderstanding on
Contract Formation and Reformation Under the Restatement, Second, 65 MICH. L. REv. 33, 39-44
(1965) (arguing, in part, that the "reason to know" test puts an excessive emphasis upon
"fault" and improperly permits the use of context evidence even though the language being
interpreted is not ambiguous).
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color the edges of inference. 54 Nevertheless, the "reason to know" test is
an attempt to connect a number of standards determining the effect,
scope, and meaning of assent to the relevant commercial context and to
guide the court in determining which party's understanding should be
preferred. As such, it offers greater guidance than does Article Two of
the UCC.55
B. Failure of Agreement-Nature and Effct
A vital condition to the court's power to supply a term under sec-
tion 204 is that the "parties . have not agreed with respect to a term
which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties .... "
There are two main problems with this condition. First, what is a fail-
ure of agreement, and second, what is the effect of such failure of agree-
ment? Does a failure to agree mean that no contract was formed and
hence that performance should be discharged, or that the court should
supply a reasonable term? These questions go to the heart of the prob-
lem. To illustrate, let us focus on the price term.
Some failures of agreement are apparent from the time the parties
conclude the bargain. For example, the bargain may say nothing about
price or may explicitly leave the price "to be agreed" upon by the par-
ties. Other failures become apparent as performance unfolds, new infor-
mation is discovered, or circumstances change. Suppose, for example,
that the bargain provides for a "base price subject to escalation" every
four months. After performance has begun, the parties disagree over the
meaning of "escalation," the supplier claiming that escalation according
to the wholesale price index was intended and the purchaser insisting
that the intended index used consumer prices. If the parties cannot re-
solve the dispute by agreement, their failure to agree jeopardizes the
bargain. Finally, suppose that the bargain provides for a "base price
subject to quarterly escalation based upon the wholesale price index."
At the time the bargain was concluded, the parties assumed that the
historical pattern of wholesale price fluctuation would, within a pro-
54 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977)
(equal treatment in medical school admissions); Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870
(Okla. 1979) (personal injuries in self-service store).
55 In the UCC, "reason to know" refers to a party having notice of a fact, U.C.C. § 1-
205(25)(c), and is used sparingly in Article Two. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312(2), 2-315, 2-712(2)(a).
Disputes over the effectiveness and meaning of manifestations must be resolved by first con-
sulting the definition of agreement, U.C.C. § 1-201(3), and then the particular sections of
Article Two that govern the issue at hand. On contract interpretation, see U.C.C. §§ 1-205,
2-202 to 2-208. See also Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355 (4th Cir.
1980); Kleinschmidt Div. of SCM Corp. v. Futuronics Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 972, 363 N.E.2d 701,
395 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1977) (failure to agree means that parties did not intend to contract);
U.C.C. § 2-204. Despite its commitment to contextualization, the UCC tends to mask the




jected scale, continue for the duration of the contract. In fact, the pat-
tern escalates sharply beyond the original projections and a dispute
arises. The supplier argues that the price term has failed its essential
purpose and should be modified. The purchaser argues that the agree-
ment was clear when the bargain was concluded and that the supplier
assumed the risk of such a change. In each of the above cases, the initial
agreement was deficient in some manner, and the parties failed to cure
the defect by subsequent agreement. Are these cases instances in which
the court should supply a reasonable term under section 204?
1. Open Price
The easiest case is one in which the parties have left the price term
open or "to be agreed." If, at the time of litigation, the parties still have
not agreed on this essential term, can the court supply a "reasonable"
price under section 204? They may do so if, at the time of contracting,
the parties intended to conclude a bargain without a further manifesta-
tion of assent and the bargain is "reasonably certain"-that is, the
"terms of the contract" provide a basis for determining the existence of a
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.56 How is a dispute over
the parties' intention to be resolved? Under the Restatement Second, the
fact that a term is left open "may show that a manifestation of intention
is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance, '57 and
the "may show" question is answered by determining if the person to
whom the purported offer is made "knows or has reason to know that
the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has
made a further manifestation of assent."'58 Uncertainties over intention
may be resolved by subsequent "part performance. ' 59 In the absence of
this, however, the Restatement Second suggests that the presence of an ex-
plicit provision for future price agreement strongly indicates that the
parties do not intend to be bound.60 Even so, the conclusion that no
contract exists is not automatic. The parties may intend to conclude the
bargain and this intention, in disputed cases, is ascertained through the
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 34(1) & (2) (1979); id., Comment a.
57 Id. § 33(3).
58 Id. § 26; see id. § 33(3), Comment c. The question is what the purported offeree,
rather than the purported offeror, "has reason to know" in the total situation. See id. § 26,
Comment a.
59 Id. § 34(2). Part performance may also "remove uncertainty," and action "in reliance
on an agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate even though uncertainty is not
removed." Id. § 34(3); see Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302
So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 1974) ("The courts should be extremely hesitant in holding a contract
void for idefiniteness, particularly where one party has performed under the contract and
allowed the other party to obtain the benefit of his performance.").
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33, Illustration 8 (1979); see U.C.C. § 2-
204(3), Comment ("The more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have
intended to conclude a binding agreement. .. 2).
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"reason to know" test. If the requisite intention is present, section 204,
much like UCC 2-305,61 is waiting in the wings to assist in filling the
gap.
2. Disputes Over Meaning
A more complex case arises when the parties have intended to con-
clude a bargain, the price term assented to is "base price plus escala-
tion," and both parties assert different understandings of what
"escalation" means, the supplier claiming that it means "wholesale price
index" and the ptirchaser claiming that the "consumer price index" pro-
vides the better definition. Even though the parties have apparently
failed to agree on an essential term, section 204 is inapplicable until (1)
the process of contract interpretation is completed,62 and (2) if that pro-
cess does not produce a basis for preferring one party's understanding
over the other's, courts find that the manifestation of assent does not fail
because the parties attached "materially different meanings to their
manifestations .... ,"63 In both of these inquiries, "the reason to know"
test plays an important role.
The problems here are familiar and have received extensive treat-
ment in the literature." The Restatement Second's approach to contract
interpretation rejects the view that words have plain meanings, that the
court should, as a matter of law, determine meaning from the four cor-
ners of a writing, and that there are rules of interpretation or reasonable
meanings waiting "out there" for discovery and application. 65 Rather,
whether or not the language used is ambiguous on its face, the Restate-
ment Second encourages the parties to plumb the context surrounding the
particular bargain to aid the trier of fact in interpreting the "term"-
that is, ascertaining its "meaning. '66 To illustrate, consider briefly what
the supplier must do to establish that his understanding of the term "es-
calation" should prevail.
Under section 201, the supplier's meaning prevails if both parties
61 The Restatement Second follows the Code's approach regarding the effect of an "open"
price term with the following exceptions: (1) the question under the Code is whether the
parties intended "to make a contract" rather than to conclude a bargain; (2) the "reason to
know" test is adopted to resolve disputes over intention; and (3) the standards apply to all
bargains, not just contracts for the sale of goods. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 21 (1979) (intention to create legal obligations not required).
62 Id. §§ 201-204.
63 Id. § 20(1).
64 See, e.g., Farnsworth, "Meani'g" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE LJ. 939 (1967). See
alro Braucher, supra note 2.
65 See Braucher, supra note 2, at 13-15.
66 "Interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of its
meaning." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1979). When the meaning at-
tached by one party to a term is to be preferred, the term is "interpreted in accordance" with
that meaning. Id. § 201(2).
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have attached the same meaning to the term. This result follows even
though the language has a more reasonable meaning in prevailing trade
usage.67 But if each party attaches a different meaning, the supplier's
meaning prevails if "at the time the agreement was made" either (1) the
supplier did not know that the purchaser attached a different meaning
and the purchaser "knew the meaning attached" by the supplier, or (2)
the supplier "had no reason to know of any different meaning attached"
by the purchaser and the purchaser "had reason to know the meaning
attached" by the supplier.68 Assuming this actual knowledge test is not
satisfied and both parties are of ordinary intelligence, where do we go
from here?69
What either party "had reason to know" must be determined in
"light of all the circumstances" at the time of the contract formation.
70
There are certain "rules" or guides that aid interpretation; for example,
the "principal purpose" of the parties will be given "great weight," and
a "writing is interpreted as a whole .... ,,71 But if the "principal pur-
pose" is simply that both parties wanted to achieve price flexibility
based upon changes in costs, and the other written terms shed no light
on the intended meaning of the term in dispute, these rules do not ad-
vance the inquiry. A potential source of guiding principles is the actual
conduct of the parties, either in a previous course of dealing 7'2 or in a
course of performance under the particular bargain. 73 If either pattern
shows mutual acquiescence to the wholesale-price index as the measure
of escalation, the supplier would have no "reason to know" that the pur-
chaser originally meant the consumer-price index, and the purchaser
would have "reason to know" that the supplier meant the wholesale-
price index. If conduct of the parties does not resolve the dispute, the
supplier might be able to show that the term "escalation" had a "gener-
ally prevailing meaning"'74 or a usage consistent with "wholesale-price
index."75
If these requirements are satisfied, then the supplier's consistent
meaning should prevail over the purchaser's inconsistent meaning under
the "reason to know" test. 76 Even if a contextual analysis shows that
67 Id. § 20 1(1); see Farnsworth, supra note 64, at 942-52.
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2) (1979); see id. § 20(2).
69 Assume also that the parties did not intend to adopt either a completely or partially
integrated writing. See id. §§ 209-218. For a critical review of the Restatement Second's treat-
ment of the parol evidence rule, see Murray, The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agree-
ments Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1342 (1975).
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201, Comment b (1979).
71 Id. § 202(1) & (2).
72 Id. § 223; cf. U.C.C. § 1-205(1).
73 Id. § 202(4); cf. U.C.C. § 2-208 (course of performance).
74 ,rd. § 202 (3) (a).
75 Id. § 220.
76 See id. where the "reason to know" test links usage relevant to interpretation to the
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neither party knew nor had reason to know anything that would justify
preferring one understanding over the other, the Restatement Second pro-
vides some tie breakers. The court might be persuaded to interpret the
language against the draftsman, 7 7 or to find that the supplier's meaning
"serves the public interest" and the purchaser's does not.78 In any event,
the range of relevant evidence, tie breakers, "rules in aid," and "stan-
dards of preference" in interpretation, coupled with a predisposition to
find a meaning when the parties have intended to conclude a bargain,
79
suggest that one party's meaning probably will be found to prevail in
most cases. This reduces somewhat the probability that the court will
be unable to interpret the term, and therefore narrows the potential
scope of section 204 in disputes over meaning.
What is the legal effect when the interpretation process fails to pro-
duce a sensible basis for preferring one party's attached meaning over
the other's? Put another way, what happens when the "reason to know"
test fails to produce a winner, or where, in the words of the Restatement
Second commentary, "neither party is at fault or. . . both parties are
equally at fault?"'8 0 According to section 20(1), there is "no manifesta-
tion of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach materially
different meanings to their manifestations." In short, there is no con-
tract. According to section 204, the court may supply a term, and pre-
sumably enforce the contract, where the parties "have not agreed with
respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and
duties . . . ." But the assumption underlying section 204 is that the
agreement is sufficiently defined to be a contract. Its application, there-
fore, depends upon whether the different meanings attached to the
terms "escalation," "wholesale price index," and "consumer price in-
dex" are material. Except for Illustrations of the continuing voyage of
the good ship Peerless,8 1 the Comments and Reporter's Notes to Section
20 offer little assistance, only suggesting that a "contract should be held
nonexistent under this Section only when the misunderstanding goes to
conflicting and irreconcilable meanings of a material term that could
search for meaning under § 201. In the ranking of priorities, however, usage of trade is given
less weight in interpretation than course of dealing and course of performance. See id.
§ 203(b); Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for An Inftxible
Rule, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 515 (1981). Cf. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (course of dealing controls trade
usage).
77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979).
78 Id. § 207.
79 See id. § 33, Comment a (In cases in which the parties "have intended to conclude a
binding agreement, even though one or more terms are missing or are left to be agreed upon
... courts endeavor, if possible, to attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the bargain.").
80 Id. § 20, Comment d.
81 Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 275 (Ex. 1864); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20, Comment d, Illustrations 1-4 (1979).
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have either but not both meanings. '82 This being the test, perhaps the
rarity of true cases of equivocation, coupled with a bias toward enforce-
ment in cases in which the parties intend to conclude a bargain, will tip
the balance in favor of section 204. Even so, if there is no reasonable
meaning of the term "escalation" in the commercial context, the bar-
gain is arguably fatally indefinite and should not be enforced .
3
3. Failure of Basic Assumption
In this final example of failure of agreement, the price term is ini-
tially clear and complete: the purchaser agrees to pay a base price sub-
ject to quarterly escalation by a formula based on the "wholesale price
index." Later, changed circumstances cause wholesale prices to escalate
to unanticipated heights. Although the price term is still clear, the sup-
plier claims that the agreement has failed because the term is no longer
suitable for its intended purpose. This claim raises a defense called "im-
possibility" of performance in the first Restatement84 and "impracticabil-
ity" of performance in the Restatement Second.85 Whether the defense
succeeds turns upon whether the supplier, either by agreement or for
other reasons, assumed the risk of the changed circumstances and their
effect upon performance. Section 261 of the Restatement Second concludes
that the answer is no if the supplier's "performance is made impractica-
ble without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made .. .
unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary. ' 86 Al-
though the "reason to know" test does not apply here, the "basic as-
sumption" test-with its emphasis on "language" and
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20, Comment d (1979); id., Reporter's
Note. See also Oswald v. Allen, 417 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1969); Young, Equivocation in the Making of
Agreements, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 619, 621 (1964).
83 Put differently, § 20(1) permits A to escape from a bargain intended to be final be-
cause of a mutual, material misunderstanding of a term assented to. B is able to enforce the
bargain, however, if either the process of interpretation reveals that A had reason to know of
B's meaning or, if there was no agreement, the court can supply a reasonable term under
§ 204. If the "total situation" cannot produce either an agreement or a reasonable term, the
rare situation of equivocation apparently has been reached. But should the court conclude
that no contract was formed or that a contract failed for indefiniteness? Part performance or
reliance on the bargain dictates the indefiniteness route because the Restatement Second pro-
vides more coherent protection for the reliance interests involved. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(b); id., Comment c. See a/so Frigaliment Importing Co. v.
B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Corbin, The Interpretation of Words
and the Parot Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 169-70 (1965).
84 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 454-469 (1932).
85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302-315 (1979).
86 Sections 261-272 of the Restatement Second are derived from the "basic assumption" test
of U.C.C. § 2-615. To date, the courts have rejected the Code's apparent invitation to expand
the basis for relief from the current changed circumstances doctrine. See Speidel, Excusable
Non-Performance in Sates Contracts: Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C.L. REv. 241,
254-71 (1980).
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"circumstances" -indicates that the total context must be considered in
determining whether the occurrence of the event was contemplated in
the establishment of the agreed price term and whether, if so, the sup-
plier should still assume this risk.8 7 If the supplier succeeds in this uphill
battle, the legal effect is that "his duty to render that performance is
discharged.""" Although one could easily conclude that the parties had
"not agreed" within the language of section 204, the "constructive con-
dition" of impracticability that is imposed upon the parties leads to dis-
charge of performance rather than preservation of the contract with a
reasonable term supplied by the court.8 9 Thus, there is no readily dis-
cernible middle ground on questions of enforceability in this area of
failed agreement: the bargain is either enforceable under the term as
originally agreed, or performance is discharged. If discharged, however,
section 204 still provides the basis for supplying a reasonable term to
achieve justice in the fashioning of appropriate remedies, including sev-
ering and enforcing the unexecuted parts of the bargain. 90
87 The crucial interpretation question is this: At what point can courts conclude that
the parties did not intend the promisor to assume a particular risk, even though the language
used is clear and unconditional? The limits of agreement, tacit or otherwise, are reached
when, at the time of contracting, the risk was not foreseeable, and its occurrence makes per-
formance "vitally different." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory
Note to ch. 11 (1979); id. §§ 261-272. But this interpretation process overlaps with a policy
question: When should the promisor be held to assume the risk even though he did not agree?
One answer is when the promisor is the "least-cost" or "superior" risk bearer, because he is in
the best position to anticipate the risk and provide against it in the contract or through mar-
ket insurance, even if he has not in fact done so. Excusing the promisor would constitute an
inefficient reallocation of resources. See Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibihip and Related Doctrines
in Contract Law.- An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977). See generally Goetz & Scott,
Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). This "gap
filling" model for risk allocation may be inappropriate in some situations. See Speidel, supra
note 2, at 383-86, 396-400.
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1979).
89 See Patterson, Constnictive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 943-54
(1942).
90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272(2) (1979), which provides that
when the normal rules for post-discharge relief "will not avoid injustice," the court may grant
relief on such terms as justice requires, including protection of the "reliance interest." Ac-
cording to Comment c, in appropriate cases a court may "sever" the agreement, "require that
some unexecuted part of it be performed on both sides," and in the process, supply a term
"which is reasonable in the circumstances." Cf. U.C.C. § 2-165, Comments 5 & 6 (court has
power to adjust the contended terms). A similar remedy is available when a contract is
voided for mutual mistake. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158(2) (1979); id.
Comment c. In the Reporter's view, these "innovative" sections are designed to "take ac-
count of a party's reliance losses even if expenditures have not benefited the other party."
Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 7-8; see Young, Half-Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19, 30-34
(1981) (predicting frequent invocation of § 272(2) by parties to bargains dislocated by
changed economic circumstances). Despite this innovation, the Restatement Second does not
directly support the unprecedented result in Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, 499 F.
Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), in which the court held that: (1) the promisor did not assume the
risk of economic dislocations not anticipated at the time of contract formation as likely to
occur; (2) although the promisor was entitled to some relief, the completed performance
would not be disturbed and the unexecuted part of the bargain's performance would not be
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C. Supplying the Reasonable Term
The Restatement Second's commitment to contextualization in dis-
putes over intention is structured by a series of analytical steps that must
be taken before section 204 can be applied. First, have the parties failed
to agree with respect to a term that is essential to a determination of
their rights and duties under the bargain? In answering this question,
the "reason to know" test provides a link between disputes over the par-
ticular bargain and the surrounding context, and reduces somewhat the
dangers of overbreadth in the use of standards.9' Second, what are the
legal consequences if the parties have failed to agree? If they did not
"intend" to conclude a bargain or if there was a "material misunder-
standing," no contract is formed. If performance was rendered imprac-
ticable under section 261, performance under the contract is discharged.
In these situations, section 204 is not available, except to achieve reme-
dial justice in post-discharge cases. Finally, in the seemingly limited
case in which section 204 should apply, what is a term that is "reason-
able in the circumstances" which the court is invited to supply? It is
here that the court must focus upon how to fill gaps in a bargain that,
subject to the general requirement of definiteness, should be enforced.
Unfortunately, a conscientious focus reveals an imperfect method-
ological blueprint. The Comments remind us that although the
processes of interpretation and gap filling overlap in that both use the
surrounding context, the application of section 204 first requires a con-
clusion that there was in fact no agreement. Clarity of analysis therefore
dictates that the court should not supply a term that the parties proba-
bly would have agreed to had they considered it.92 Instead, the court,
in searching for a term that is "reasonable in the circumstances," should
supply a term that "comports with community standards of fairness and
policy."'93 This is the direct and fair way to proceed when a court is
imposing terms without agreement-to identify the relevant "commu-
nity," to ascertain the standards that control similar problems in that
community, and if they are fair or comport with reasonable policy, sup-
ply them to fill the gap. If this effort is not successful, presumably the
contract fails for indefiniteness.
94
discharged; and (3) the appropriate remedy was reformation in the form of a court-imposed
price adjustment to replace a price term that had failed of its essential purpose, with the
expectation that the parties would continue performance under the adjusted term.
91 But see Palmer, supra note 53 (arguing that in interpretation cases, the "reason to
know" test provides an inadequate control upon judicial access to the surrounding
circumstances).
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204, Comments a, c (1979).
93 Id., Comment d. In an earlier article, Professor Farnsworth suggested that "gap
filling" should be by "inference" whether based on "actual expectations or on general princi-
ples of fairness and justice." Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 860, 891.
94 A sensible reading of § 204 is that the bargain must be "sufficiently defined to be a
contract" after the court has supplied a term. A fatal indefiniteness, therefore, may lie either
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It is, of course, at this point that the Restatement Second, much like
Article Two of the UCC, launches the court into the commercial context
without a paddle. There are some helpful hints, such as the suggestion
that evidence unearthed in the interpretation process may be relevant to
gap filling and that the term to be supplied when the parties fail to
agree on price is a "reasonable price at the time for delivery."95 Beyond
this, the going is a bit murky. The Restatement Second provides no gui-
dance on (1) who has what burden of proof,96 (2) whether the term to be
supplied is a question of law or fact, (3) how contextual evidence should
be developed, particularly the ascertainment of "community" stan-
dards, 97 or (4) the judicial "style" to be pursued by a court in supplying
terms.98 The search is further complicated by the explicit extension of
the power to supply terms in contracts that call for more than just the
sale of goods. In transactions in goods, at least, there is some basis for
belief that functioning markets and the practices of merchants will pro-
in the term supplied or in other terms in the bargain. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 33, 34 (1979).
95 Id. § 204, Comment d; see U.C.C. § 2-305(1).
96 Normally, the burden of establishing the "reasonable" term would be on the party
seeking to enforce the contract as completed by the court. Standards rather than rules in
these cases arguably provide the plaintiff an opportunity to produce contextual evidence rele-
vant to the dispute over meaning or indefiniteness. See Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N.Y. 223, 234,
111 N.E. 822, 826 (1916) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). See also Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 884-87
(relevance of which party has the "burden of expression").
97 The complexity and importance of identifying norms in the social matrix surrounding
the particular contract is developed in I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN IN-
QUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980). In addition to "common" con-
tract norms, Macneil suggests that more particular norms are derived from the nature of the
exchange relationship, ie., whether its characteristics are "discrete" or "relational." Thus, a
"common" contract norm is "contractual solidarity," the norm of holding exchanges to-
gether. This norm is intensified in a highly relational exchange, such as a long-term supply
contract, and is supplemented by the relational norms of preserving the relationship and
harmonizing conflict. Id. at 66-69. Among other effects, these norms should influence how
the court approaches "gap filling," if not actually providing the "reasonable" term. See Spei-
del, supra note 2, at 400-04. Professor Macneil views the Restatement Second as an example of
neo-classical contract law. See Macneil, supra note 13. One major limitation of this approach
is that the parties are expected, at the time of contracting, to reach a high level of agreement
on future performance and risk and are penalized for failures of agreement that are explicable
when relational features are taken into account. See Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts
and Presentation, 60 VA. L. REv. 589 (1974). For an application of economic analysis to rela-
tional contracts, see Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089
(1981).
98 For an argument that Llewellyn's grand style ofjudicial decisionmaking is best suited
for finding the law "immanent" in the total situation, see Note, How Appellate Opinions Should
ystj Decisions Made Under the UCC., 29 STAN. L. REv. 1245, 1247-54 (1977). For recent
examples ofjudicial method in gap filling, see North Central Airlines, Inc. v. Continental Oil
Co., 574 F.2d 582, 592-93 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (search for reasonable price when external price
escalation standard fails); Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53,
58-59, 80 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (court replaces escalation formula that had failed its essential pur-
pose). See also Borg-Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling Co., 16 Ill. 2d 234, 244-46, 156 N.E.2d
513, 518-19 (1958) (standards for court or jury to fix reasonable terms of employment).
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vide the ingredients for gap filling.99 In short, under section 204, the
court and the litigating parties could be lost in a sea of overbroad stan-
dards and conflicting evidence in the search for norms which, if they
exist, rise no higher than the morals of the marketplace.'0 0
Even if these difficulties can be overcome, section 204 seems to be
strangely isolated from the bargaining dynamics of the parties and the
remedy available to enforce the bargain as completed by the court. The
Restatement Second recognizes the relationship between the degree of cer-
tainty in the bargain and the appropriateness of the specific perform-
ance as a remedy;' 0 ' beyond this, however, it appears to be indifferent to
whether enforcement of the section 204 bargain is by damages or spe-
cific performance. Suppose that equitable remedies, including specific
performance, become the rule in contract litigation10 2 and preservation
and completion of the exchange becomes a dominant objective. In this
case, the absence of a clearer method for gap filling raises serious ques-
tions about the legitimacy of judicial power in transactions in which
consent, rather than imposition, provides the theoretical underpinning
for contract liability and remedy. To the extent that the method pro-
vides a control on the exercise of this power, it also structures the exer-
cise of equitable remedial powers.'
0 3
These concerns are softened somewhat by the power of the parties
at any time to resolve the dispute or supply the essential term by agree-
ment. Even if the court supplies a term thought to be unreasonable in
the circumstances and orders specific performance, the parties could still
by agreement either discharge performance under the contract or adjust
and continue performance under the decree. Thus, section 204, like the
duty of good faith,10 4 can be viewed as a court's control mechanism for
99 See generally W. TWINING, supra note 24, at 340.
100 See Danzig, supra note 33, at 629-30. To Danzig, the delegation of a legislative func-
tion to courts through standards is premised on the "triad of dubious assumptions that self-
evident ideal resolutions of situational problems exist, that they can be discovered by careful
scrutiny of actual situations, and that once articulated they will be widely accepted." More
important, the delegation of power to make "ethical judgments about the good society and
technical observations . . . about how to reach that society" to judges is objectionable on
grounds of democratic theory: these judgments and techniques should be openly debated in
the legislatures. Id. at 635.
101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1979); id., Comment b.
102 See Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedes-Efiency, Equit, and the Second Re-
statement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981) (arguing for the general use of specific perform-
ance; traditional concerns for efficiency are often unfounded). See also Schwartz, The Casefor
Specifit Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (specific performance should be available on
request). On the whole, the Restatement Second continues the preference of the common law for
damages over specific performance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 345,
357-369 (1979); Farnsworth, Legal Remediesfor Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1149-60 (1970).
'03 See Speidel, supra note 2, at 395-419.
104 Section 205 provides that "every contract imposes on each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." The presence of this duty preserves
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holding the deal together and providing pressure for agreed adjustments
by the parties. Despite the costs involved in this effort, the long-range
efficiencies of mechanisms that encourage completion of the exchange
under agreed adjustments may justify the effort. 10 5
III
LIMITATIONS OF THE Restatement Second APPROACH
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, commenced in the ebb of
the realist attack on classical contract law, was completed after the tri-
umph of standards over rules in Article Two of the UCC. The results
are reflected in the Restatement Second's treatment of the bargain contract
and in section 204. Contract formation is not precluded simply because
the parties have failed to agree on an essential term. If they intended to
conclude a bargain, if there is no material misunderstanding, and if the
terms are reasonably certain, the court may supply a term "reasonable
in the circumstances" and enforce the contract as completed. At each
stage of the analysis, the key questions within the general requirements
for contract formation are determined by standards that require contex-
tualization rather than strict application of rule. When the effectiveness
of the assent or the meaning of the agreement is disputed, the "reason to
know" test provides a method to link the particular transaction to the
surrounding context. Through this linking technique and the more
elaborate analysis contained in the Comments and Reporter's Note, the
Restatement Second has improved upon the neo-classical model of contract
represented by Article Two of the UCC. To this extent, it is an impres-
sive document in the post-realist analytic tradition. 10
6
Nevertheless, certain limitations within the Restatement Second for-
mulation undercut any conclusion that section 204 represents a new
spirit of contract law. 107 First, the scope of section 204 is limited by the
the contract against most assertions that one party has reserved excessive power, e.g., to spec-
ify price or to order requirements (see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 34(1)
(1979); id., Comment b) without the need to give the standard content. Although placed side
by side, §§ 204 and 205 make no explicit reference to each other. One definition of bad faith,
however, is conduct that violates "community standards of decency, fairness or reasonable-
ness." Id. § 205, Comment a. Since this definition is consistent with the standards set to
measure a term "reasonable in the circumstances," id. § 204, Comment d, it is probable that
the sections reinforce and establish a floor below which a court cannot go to supply a term.
See Note, supra note 98, at 1256-59.
105 In short, the efficiencies involved in encouraging adjustments in exchange relation-
ships may be greater than those involved in discharging the contract or enforcing it as origi-
nally agreed. See Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,
22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 238-42 (1979); note 97 supra.
106 See White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social
Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279 (1973). See also Feinman, The Role of Ideas in Legal History, 78
MICH. L. REV. 722 (1980).
107 See Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 89, 91 (W.D. Pa.
1980), in which the court suggested that the "new spirit" of contract reflected the "need for a
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bias of the Restatement Second toward either-or solutions. Courts will tend
to find either that the parties agreed on the essential term, or if they did
not, that no contract was formed or that performance should be dis-
charged. The middle ground allowing for the application of section 204
is thereby reduced, although half-measures may be appropriate in the
fashioning of post-discharge remedies. 08
Second, when section 204 is applicable, there is no discernible
method to guide or control a court as it searches for a term "reasonable
in the circumstances." The "reason to know" test is limited to ascertain-
ing the effectiveness and meaning of agreement. Unless the process of
interpretation uncovers market standards or establishes usage or prac-
tice to which the parties have not agreed, section 204 seemingly invites
the court to meddle in the total situation in the search for "community
standards of fairness or policy."' 0 9 Without guidance, this invitation
could be costly and contribute to a conclusion that the bargain fails for
indefiniteness. This is the price to be paid for the use of overbroad stan-
dards in a general theory of contract that, unlike Article Two of the
UCC, is far removed from the particular types of exchange transactions
that generate the disputes." 10 In fact, section 204 stops at the very point
where it might have begun to develop a method to employ the context
more fully."'
Third, the Restatement Second is insensitive to other issues likely to
arise in disputes involving section 204. The focus is upon failures of
agreement at the time of contracting. Does either party have a duty to
negotiate in good faith thereafter in an effort to resolve the dispute by
agreement? What are their responsibilities to "keep the deal together,"
and what effect should this have upon the application of section 204?
Similarly, to what extent should the application of section 204 depend
on the remedy sought by the aggrieved party? Beyond the level of cer-
tainty needed for specific performance, the Restatement Second makes no
connection between the power of the court to supply a term under sec-
body of law compatible with responsible commercial practices and understandings" and re-
quired the courts to give "close attention to the legitimate business aims of the parties, to their
purpose of avoiding the risks of great losses, and to the need to frame a remedy to preserve the
essence of the agreement." On the facts in Essex, this spirit, wafting in from such post-realist
triumphs as the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement Second, directed the court to
reform the contract by imposing a new escalation term on an unwilling buyer. Whether the
court unwittingly released a more powerful spirit from an untapped keg remains to be seen.
108 See Young, supra note 90.
109 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204, Comment d (1979).
1 10 "The Restatement of this Subject .. .does not deal with special rules governing
particular types of contracts .... " Id., Introduction.
i See Gordley, European Codes and Atnerican Reslatements: Some Di,?culties, 81 COLUN'I. L.
REv. 140, 149 (1981). The author suggests that the reason for "cloudy" rules in a code or
Restatement may be the inability "to distinguish the cases that call for one result from those
that call for another." Greater clarity does not result; rather, the effect is "merely to draw a
circle around a problem and leave it for someone else to resolve."
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tion 204 and the power of the court to enjoin breach and order specific
performance. In future transactions, the presence of "reasonable cer-
tainty," plus an increased availability of equitable remedies, will give a
court wider latitude to preserve the relationship and adjust it with a
supplied term. The either-or approach of the Restatement Second and its
preference for damages slights this potential development and, by so do-
ing, could impede its utility as a transitional device. 112
A final limitation lies in the failure to articulate a complete theory
of contract. This is to be expected in a document that intentionally
isolates itself from much of the world around it I11 and was drafted by a
private group. The perspective was necessarily retrospective. Com-
promises were made. In fact, the Reporters should be congratulated for
improving on the first Restatement's undergirding theory, providing use-
ful analysis and method, and resisting the temptation to embrace the
positive or normative implications of economic analysis.1I4 Neverthe-
less, the Restatement Second was completed at a time when a rich, new
literature on contract was emerging. Whether the focus of this literature
is on economic efficiency, relational theory, moral obligation, altruism,
or distributive justice,' 15 the underlying and competing values are rele-
vant to both a more complete theory of contract and the clutch of ques-
tions that swirl around section 204. Whether these values-these
concerns over substance-simply help to fill out or supplement a theory
based upon contextualization, or are the lynchpins for an overarching
112 Some of these questions and the voluminous literature have been analyzed in Speidel,
Court-Imposed Price Adjstments Under Long- Tern Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 369 (1981).
See also the excellent work of Professor Robert Hillman, much of which is cited and discussed
in Hillman, A Study of Uniform Commercial Code Methodolog." Contract Modifcation Under Article
Two, 59 N.C.L. REv. 335 (1981).
113 The focus of the Restatement Second is upon the "legal relations arising from promises
and the remedies available when a promise is broken." The Restatement Second does not "at-
tempt to state the rules governing executed transactions or obligations not based upon
promises" or attempt a "comprehensive statement of the rules governing particular types of
contracts, or of the impact of modern legislation on the law of contracts." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introduction (1979). Although Chapter 8, Topic 1, deals with the
unenforceability of promises on grounds of public policy, the Restatement Second makes "no
effort. . . to state comprehensively the rules governing statutory obligations imposed on con-
tracting parties regardless of their assent." Id.
114 See, e.g., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAw (1979).
For critical comments on the role of economic efficiency in contract law, see Kennedy &
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Ejlient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711 (1980); Macneil, Eco-
nomic Analsis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Needfor a "Rich Classiftcato.y Appara-
tus," 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1018 (1981).
115 See, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGA-
TIONS (1981); I. MACNEIL, supra note 97; Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of
the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1713-37, 1767-76 (1976); Kronman, Contract Law and
Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Symposium, Efjiien as a Legal Concern, 8 HoF-
STRA L. REv. 485 (1980);A Response to the Eftiiengy Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 811 (1980).
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structure for the future, remains to be seen. In any event, the Restatement
Second largely downplays these substantive questions.
CONCLUSION
This, perhaps, is the way of contracts Restatements. The first Re-
statement, completed in 1933, perfected the time honored methods of the
past for then current consumption. The Restatement Second has elabo-
rated, if not perfected, the methodology of contextualization implicit in
1933 in the work of Arthur Corbin. The Restatement Third, scheduled for
completion in 2030 under the direction of an as yet unnamed Reporter,
will undoubtedly incorporate those substantive ideas that emerge in an
ever-changing world, and perhaps perfect a new system of rules imposed
more from "out there" than derived from the commercial context. As
Corbin so aptly put it:
Life marches on, with new conditions and interests, causing constant
judicial development. Other times, other mores; other mores, other
law. t1
6
116 Corbin, supra note 5, at 1329. To paraphrase Grant Gilmore, contract law is the
process by which courts accommodate change without abandoning society's fundamental
structure. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 14 (1977). The Restatement Second can
best be understood as a limited summary of marginal changes that are underway within a
structure assumed to be stable. As such, it also can be described as a rationalization for
results that are determined by the allocation of economic power within that structure. See
Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 1383.
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